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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

**CASE ANALYSIS OF THE FORT ORD RESTORATION
ADVISORY BOARD 1995-1999**

by

Larry L. McGuire

March 2001

Thesis Co-Advisors:

Susan Hocevar
Cary Simon

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This research analyzes the successful and less successful practices of the Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board in expediting environmental cleanup at Fort Ord, making former military land available for civilian use. It includes descriptions of Base Realignment and Closure selection criteria, President Clinton's Revitalization Initiative, the Restoration Advisory Board process, and an extensive literature review of citizen involvement in advisory groups and conflict. Nine semi-structured interviews were conducted with Army representatives, regulatory agency representatives, citizens, and other individuals that were either members of or associated with the Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board. This paper draws conclusions and offers recommendations about how challenges encountered by the Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board can be avoided at other military installations that either have existing advisory boards or are required to form boards due to future Base Realignment and Closure actions.

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**CASE ANALYSIS OF THE FORT ORD RESTORATION ADVISORY BOARD
1995-1999**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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
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
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LIST OF ACRONYMS

| | |
|--------|---|
| BCT | BRAC Cleanup Team |
| BEC | BRAC Environmental Coordinator |
| BRAC | Base Realignment and Closure |
| BTC | Base Transition Coordinator |
| CBO | Congressional Budget Office |
| CERCLA | Community Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act |
| CERFA | Community Environmental Response Facilitation Act |
| DERTF | Defense Environmental Response Task Force |
| DoD | Department of Defense |
| EA | Environmental Assessment |
| EDC | Economic Development Conveyance |
| EIS | Environmental Impact Statement |
| EPA | Environmental Protection Agency |
| FONSI | Finding of No Significant Impacts |
| FORA | Fort Ord Reuse Authority |
| FOTP | Fort Ord Toxics Project |
| GAO | General Accounting Office |
| LRA | Local Redevelopment Authority |
| MOM | Measures of Merit |
| NEPA | National Environmental Policy Act |
| OSD | Office of the Secretary of Defense |
| PBC | Public Benefit Conveyance |
| RAB | Restoration Advisory Board |
| RI/FS | Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study |
| ROD | Record of Decision |
| TAG | Technical Assistance Grant |
| TRC | Technical Review Committee |

I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

This study analyzes the Restoration Advisory Board (RAB) process and its successful and less-successful practices in facilitating "fast-track" cleanup at former military installations, and examines the effectiveness of the advisory group structure for accomplishing RAB goals using the Fort Ord RAB as a case study.

B. BACKGROUND

In 1993, President Clinton announced a five-part plan to revitalize communities where military installations had been closed. One of the major objectives of this plan was "fast-track" environmental cleanup of installation property. Accelerating the cleanup process allows property to be quickly and safely transferred to the community, which promotes economic recovery of the area. To accomplish this task, a RAB would be established at each closed installation with the purpose of:

1. Acting as a forum for the discussion and exchange of information between agencies and the community.
2. Providing an opportunity for stakeholders to review progress and participate in a dialogue with decision-makers. (Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Environmental Security), 1998, p. 30)

The Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board was established in 1994 and has experienced considerable difficulties environmentally restoring the former military installation, and obtaining consensus from military representatives and civilians. RAB members have experienced frustration and, despite enlisting the efforts of three mediation

groups, lawsuits and high personnel turnover have resulted, causing the “fast-track” cleanup efforts at Fort Ord to suffer numerous delays.

C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Primary:

What are the successful and less-successful practices of the Restoration Advisory Board process in transitioning Fort Ord from military to civilian use?

Secondary:

1. What is the overall Presidential and Department of Defense process for revitalizing base closure communities?
2. Who are the key stakeholders involved in the Fort Ord restoration process, including their roles, missions, and expectations?
3. What are the elements of commonality and contention among the stakeholders involved in the Restoration Advisory Board process?
4. How effective is the advisory group structure in accomplishing Restoration Advisory Board goals?
5. What actions and behaviors of the key stakeholders appear to have successfully and/or less-successfully affected Restoration Advisory Board mission accomplishment?
6. How do the stakeholders of the Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board deal with conflict?

7. What interventions by conflict resolution groups appear to increase and/or decrease collaborative behavior among Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board stakeholders?

D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This thesis is concerned with the successful and less-successful practices of the Restoration Advisory Board process, specifically the Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board, and the effectiveness of the advisory group structure in accomplishing RAB mission objectives. It will begin with an overview of the Base Realignment and Closure process and the Presidential and Department of Defense initiative establishing Restoration Advisory Boards. Second, an analysis of citizen involvement in advisory groups with additional emphasis on autonomy, expectations versus reality, and conflict will be conducted. Finally, conclusions will be drawn and recommendations made based on information gathered.

The methodology for this research will include an extensive literature review of citizen involvement in advisory groups and conflict resolution. Data collection for answering the research questions will be based on archival review of four years of Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board minutes, attendance of four Fort Ord RAB meetings, and nine semi-structured interviews of RAB members and individuals associated with the RAB.

Results from these interviews will be analyzed and conclusions drawn about successful and less-successful aspects of this case study. Lessons learned will be

provided to assist military installation commanders and civic leaders to more effectively collaborate on future projects.

E. EXPECTED BENEFITS

As stated in the Presidential and DoD initiative, Restoration Advisory Boards are required at all closing bases. Additionally, operating bases are encouraged to establish Restoration Advisory Boards to provide a forum in which the local community can become more involved with environmental issues concerning a military installation. By determining processes and interventions that created positive outcomes and those that did not, future Restoration Advisory Boards and government policy makers will have a better understanding of how to accomplish this challenging process.

F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS

This thesis is organized into five chapters. Following this first chapter is a presentation of background information that explains base realignment and closure processes. Topics include criteria used to select military bases for realignment or closure, the presidential revitalization initiative to restore economic prosperity in communities with closed military bases, and individuals and groups relevant to base closure and transition. Additional information is provided regarding the Fast-Track Cleanup section of the presidential revitalization initiative, Restoration Advisory Boards, and difficulties implementing the Fast-Track Cleanup program and operating Restoration Advisory Boards. Finally, an in depth review of the Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board is provided.

To better understand challenges encountered by citizen advisory groups, such as the Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board, a literature review was conducted. Areas of discussion in the literature review are citizen involvement in bureaucratic processes, autonomy and its relation to advisory groups, expectations versus reality of group members, and conflict among individuals and groups involved in the process.

Following the literature review, semi-structured interviews and an extensive archival review of Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board meeting minutes were conducted to determine if the Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board overcame challenges facing citizen advisory groups or succumbed to them. The results of the questionnaire used to conduct the semi-structured interviews and the archival review are presented in this chapter.

The final chapter discusses the results of the previous chapter and how they correlate to findings of the literature review. Conclusions are drawn regarding how the Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board performed and recommendations are made to assist existing and future Restoration Advisory Boards. Finally, the primary research question is answered and areas of suggested follow-on research are provided.

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II. BACKGROUND

This chapter briefly explains the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) history and selection criteria, including the President's Revitalization Initiative and Five-Point Plan to speed economic redevelopment of base closure communities. Additionally, the chapter reviews the Fast-Track Cleanup Program, the Restoration Advisory Board process, and other initiatives relevant to environmental cleanup.

A. BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE SELECTION CRITERIA

By the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense (DoD) was already taking actions to reduce its infrastructure. To accomplish this, the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission was formed to identify installations that could be closed or realigned. The categories used to determine installations for closure or realignment have remained the same through all four BRAC rounds. The basic categories are *military value*, *return on investment*, and *community impact* (U.S. Congress, House, 1995). Each category contains additional selection criteria.

Four criteria are used to determine the *military value* of an installation. Initially considered are current and future DoD mission requirements and the potential effect on operational readiness. Secondly, the availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace at both the existing installation and potential receiving installations is assessed. Next is the capability of an existing installation and potential receiving installations to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force

requirements. Finally, cost and manpower implications are considered. (U.S. Congress, House, 1995)

The criterion for *return on investment* is the extent and timing of potential costs and savings. This includes the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs. (U.S. Congress, House, 1995)

Community impact includes estimates of the economic effect on the community that has the closing base, as well as the ability of the existing or potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions, and personnel, and the environmental impact (U.S. Congress, House, 1995).

In a hearing before the House Military Installations and Facilities Subcommittee, Mr. Gotbaum, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security, stated, "[I]n making the base closing decision we [OSD] do not consider environmental cleanup costs on the basis that it is our responsibility to comply with the law and to do environmental cleanup whether a base is open or closed." (U.S. Congress, House, 1995, p. 5) While environmental cleanup costs are not a criteria for determining base closure or return on investment, they have contributed significantly to the delays in transferring property to civilian use. Environmental cleanup concerns also provided impetus for the Presidential Revitalization Initiative. The next section reviews relevant aspects of the Presidential Revitalization Initiative, followed by the Five-Point Plan and the use of Restoration Advisory Boards as part of the Fast-Track Cleanup Program.

B. PRESIDENTIAL REVITALIZATION INITIATIVE

According to a Congressional Budget Office assessment (CBO, 1996), the current DoD estimate is that it will cost \$6.6 billion to environmentally clean the bases scheduled for closing from the first four BRAC rounds. Additionally, the CBO claims that this amount is underestimated because it only accounts for the money required during the six-year period governing the completion of the BRAC process. In many cases, cleaning up buried ordnance and contaminated groundwater will probably take much longer than six years and will incur substantial additional operating and support costs. Specifically, estimates for cleaning up 1991 BRAC installations, which includes Fort Ord, CA, increased from about \$800 million to \$2 billion. Estimates are likely to continue to increase because most of DoD's cleanup work is still in the early phase of investigation and analysis.

Because of the rising costs of environmental cleanup and the slow pace of land transfer, President Clinton announced a Five-Point Plan to speed the economic recovery of base closure communities. As stated in the *Base Reuse Implementation Manual* (1997, p. 1-4), the five points of the presidential program are:

1. Job-centered property disposal that puts local economic redevelopment first.
2. Fast-Track environmental cleanup that removes needless delays while protecting human health and the environment.
3. Assignment of on-site Base Transition Coordinators at major bases slated for closure to assist communities and the Military Departments with property disposal and economic redevelopment.
4. Easy access to transition and redevelopment help for workers and communities.
5. Quick economic development planning grants to base closure communities.

The goals of the new initiative are rapid redevelopment and creation of new jobs in base closure communities. Over five years, program resources will total about \$5.0 billion. Of this amount, \$2.8 billion will be spent on economic development and transition assistance for base closure communities and civilian employees at the bases. The remaining \$2.2 billion will be spent on environmental cleanup. (Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Industrial Affairs and Installations), 1997)

C. INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS RELEVANT TO BASE CLOSURE AND TRANSITION

To implement the Five-Point Plan, individuals and groups must be designated and appointed to represent DoD and community interests in the environmental cleanup process. For example, each closing installation has a Base Transition Coordinator (BTC) to facilitate the transition of an installation to civilian use. The BTC acts as the local DoD liaison facilitating closure and reuse actions, such as inventory of property, environmental cleanup, and resolution of reuse issues. The BRAC Environmental Coordinator (BEC) is the DoD's single point of contact for environmental cleanup issues at closing bases and is a member of the BRAC Cleanup Team. The BRAC Cleanup Team (BCT) has three environmental cleanup managers, including the BEC and regulators representing the appropriate state environmental agency and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). (DoD, 1995)

The Restoration Advisory Board (RAB) is a group of citizens representing local businesses, minority groups, environmental groups, and communities who volunteer to serve as the community's voice on cleanup plans and decisions. The RAB is co-chaired

by representatives of DoD and the community. The RAB, which generally has a diverse membership that is representative of the community at large, provides advice and comment from the community to the BCT. (DoD, 1995)

Also included in the base transition process, but not part of the Five-Point Plan is the Local Redevelopment Authority (LRA). The LRA is any authority or instrumentality established by a state or local government and recognized by the Secretary of Defense through the Office of Economic Adjustment as the entity responsible for preparing the redevelopment plan for the installation or for directing implementation of the plan (DoD, 1995).

D. FAST-TRACK CLEANUP PROGRAM

As part of the Five-Point Plan, the Fast-Track Cleanup Program is governed by three guiding principles: protect human health and the environment; make property available for reuse and transfer; and provide effective community involvement (Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Environmental Cleanup), 1996). To achieve these guiding principles, the Fast-Track Cleanup Program policy, first issued in September 1993, provides three guidance and two policy memoranda. Appendix F of the *Base Reuse Implementation Manual* (1997), issued by the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Industrial Affairs and Installations), furnishes these memoranda.

Guidance memoranda detailing procedures on how to implement the Fast-Track Cleanup Program include: establishing BRAC Cleanup Teams and conducting comprehensive "bottom up" reviews of cleanup plans at closing installations; accelerating the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process; and involving the public by

making information available, providing opportunities to comment, and seeking public participation on a RAB.

Policy memoranda provide general guidance to DoD Components on the processes of determining environmental suitability to lease, and identifying uncontaminated parcels of land applying the Community Environmental Response Facilitation Act (CERFA). The policy memoranda do not specify implementation procedures thus allowing the BRAC installation to develop procedures suitable to their organizational needs without violating minimum requirements.

By November 1993, five months after the announcement of the Five-Point Plan, all 77 major closing or realigning installations established BCTs. After nine months, BCTs completed comprehensive, "bottom-up" reviews of environmental cleanup plans. (Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Environmental Cleanup), 1996)

In support of the Fast-Track Cleanup Program, EPA and DoD established a Memorandum of Understanding under which DoD provides funding to EPA for support beyond the roles and responsibilities mandated by statute. Examples of additional support from EPA include: senior-level Remedial Program Managers serving on 70 BCTs, and technical expertise and support from hydrologists, toxicologists, community relations specialists, and attorneys. By making technical experts readily available to BCTs, DoD's environmental cleanup decision-making processes are expedited, which allows cleanup actions to begin sooner. (Defense Environmental Response Task Force, 1995)

To provide a better understanding of these guidelines, short explanations of each ensue. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires public involvement throughout the planning process to build consensus for the final environmental cleanup plan. Additionally, four compliance documents are required to satisfy NEPA. These documents are an Environmental Assessment (EA), a Finding of No Significant Impacts (FONSI), an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), and a Record of Decision (ROD). The EA determines if there are any significant impacts at the site. From the EA, either no significant impacts are found and the FONSI is generated, or significant impacts are found and the EIS is generated. The ROD is the plan approved to cleanup the sites identified in an EIS. (NEPA, 1969)

DoD says that the Fast-Track Cleanup Program increases the speed of the NEPA process by requiring installations to complete the EIS within one year after a LRA submits the reuse plan (Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Industrial Affairs and Installations), 1997). The problem is that reuse plans have taken long periods of time to complete and have changed during the restoration process requiring changes to the EIS. RABs and BCTs utilize reuse plans as a basis for discussion of appropriate remedies for cleaning up property and preparing it for transfer.

Lease of property prior to environmental cleanup is another method DoD expects will speed redevelopment of base closure communities. However, DoD's authorization and appropriations acts for 1993 contained different provisions regarding the government's liability for the transfer of contaminated property. DoD viewed the appropriations act as exposing the government to costly claims because of sweeping DoD indemnification language in the law. In contrast, the authorization act limited DoD

environmental cleanup liability to conditions prior to transfer. In response, DoD stopped entering into any leases or transferring property, which delayed the transfer of property for fear of future claims. Congress subsequently repealed the appropriations language and let the authorization language stand, which limited DoD's liability to environmental contamination prior to property transfer. With this clarification, DoD proceeded with efforts to lease and transfer property prior to cleanup. (GAO/NSIAD-95-70, 1995)

The Community Environmental Response Facilitation Act (CERFA, 1992), amends the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), and requires Federal agencies to identify property on which neither hazardous substances nor petroleum products or derivatives were stored for one year or more, released, or disposed. After DoD identifies uncontaminated parcels, Federal and state environmental agencies must concur with DoD findings before the land can be transferred. As of September 1995, DoD identified about 164,000 uncontaminated acres, but only about 76,000 of those acres met regulatory agency approval for immediate transfer (CBO, 1996).

The Fast-Track Cleanup Program directs DoD to involve the community near a closing base in the cleanup program by making information available, providing opportunities for comment, and establishing and seeking public participation on a Restoration Advisory Board (RAB). The RAB works in partnership with the BRAC Cleanup Team (BCT) on cleanup issues and related matters. Through the RAB, stakeholders may review progress and provide input to the decision making process. Stakeholders, as defined by DoD and EPA, are parties that are actually or potentially

affected by restoration activities at a closing or realigning installation. (Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Industrial Affairs and Installations), 1997)

E. RESTORATION ADVISORY BOARD

This section further clarifies aspects of a Restoration Advisory Board including purpose, additional establishment criteria, procedures implementing RAB guidelines, and the fundamental responsibilities of the RAB and its members. The purpose of a RAB is to act as a forum for the discussion and exchange of information between agencies and the community, and to provide an opportunity for stakeholders to review progress and participate in a dialogue with decision-makers (DoD, 1998). The purpose of the RAB is not necessarily to obtain consensus among its members, but to provide advice to decision-makers (i.e., BCT, EPA, and state regulatory agencies) on restoration issues. By allowing stakeholders to have a voice in the restoration process, RABs can improve DoD's cleanup program by increasing community understanding and support for cleanup efforts, improve the soundness of government decisions, and ensure cleanups are responsive to community needs (Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Industrial Affairs and Installations), 1997).

According to DoD policy, one of four criteria must exist to establish a RAB: an installation closes and property is to be transferred to the community; or, at least 50 citizens petition for an advisory board at an operating installation; or, federal, state, or local government requests the formation of an advisory board; or, the installation determines the need for an advisory board. (Defense Environmental Restoration Program, 1996)

The RAB serves as an outgrowth of the Technical Review Committee (TRC) concept to provide a more comprehensive forum to discuss environmental restoration issues. Mandated by Title 10 USC Section 2705 (c), TRCs consist of representatives from the installation, EPA, state regulators, local authorities, and a single public representative. Title 10 USC Section 2705 (c) also mandated that where TRCs or other similar groups already exist, they shall be expanded or modified to become RABs, rather than creating a separate committee.

In order to convert a TRC to a RAB, the *Management Guidance for the Defense Environmental Restoration Program* (1998) outlines four steps that must be taken. First, additional representatives from the community are selected. These individuals should include the Local Redevelopment Authority and citizen representatives to include environmental and public interest groups, local government, and individual community members. The membership selection process is conducted in a fair and open manner, ideally by a community selection panel. The installation should accept the panel's nominations unless it determines that the nominees do not reflect the full range of views within the community. Second, a Community Co-Chair is selected, preferably by the community representatives, to serve with the DoD Installation Co-Chair, usually the BEC. Third, meetings are opened to the public. Finally, information and views are obtained from the public and provided to decision-makers.

Once a RAB is established, the *Management Guidance for the Defense Environmental Restoration Program* (1998) provides additional steps taken before the RAB can begin to function. First, each RAB develops a mission statement describing its overall purpose and goals. Second, each RAB establishes a set of operating procedures

that govern meetings, membership terms, methods of dispute resolution, participation of the public in meetings, and how the RAB addresses public comments. Third, points-of-contact for cleanup information are identified at the installation level, normally the BEC, and higher in the chain-of-command. Fourth, information on cleanup activities, such as draft and final technical documents, proposed and final plans, and status reports, are provided to the RAB and made available to the public in a timely manner. Finally, vehicles for disseminating information, such as public meetings, bulletins, and central repositories, are identified and used consistently.

Initially, policies were not developed on how to adjourn a RAB once it had been established, but in 1998, an interim adjournment policy was published. It stated that adjournment of a RAB might be appropriate if one of three circumstances is met: an installation completes its environmental restoration program; or, an installation has all remedies in place and the remedies are operating properly; or, there is no longer sustained community interest. (DoD, 1998)

Once established, the RAB fulfills many responsibilities. These responsibilities, according to the *Management Guidance for the Defense Environmental Restoration Program* (1998, p. 31) include:

1. providing advice to the installation, EPA, state regulatory agency, and other government agencies on environmental restoration activities and community involvement,
2. addressing important issues related to environmental restoration, such as risk information, scope of studies, cleanup levels, waste management, and remedial action alternatives,
3. reviewing documents associated with environmental restoration activities, such as plans and technical reports,
4. providing advice on proposed environmental restoration projects to be accomplished in the next fiscal year and beyond,
5. providing advice on priorities among sites or projects,

6. conducting regular meetings that are open to the public and scheduled at times and locations that are convenient for community members,
7. documenting discussions at meetings, and making the information available to repositories, and
8. interacting with the LRA or other land use planning bodies to discuss future land use issues relevant to environmental restoration decision-making.

Additionally, the *Base Reuse Implementation Manual* (1997, pp. F-13-F-14) states that a RAB will:

1. act as a forum for discussion and exchange of cleanup information between Government agencies and the public;
2. develop and maintain a mailing list of names and addresses of stakeholders who wish to receive information on the cleanup program;
3. identify applicable standards and, consistent with Section 121 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), propose remedies consistent with planned land use.

Apart from the overall responsibilities of the RAB, the DoD Installation Co-chair, Community Co-chair, RAB community members, federal and state regulatory agency members, and BCT members fulfill additional responsibilities. As the DoD representative, the DoD Installation Co-chair should:

1. ...coordinate with the Community Co-chair to prepare and distribute an agenda prior to each RAB meeting. If the RAB will address restoration related to base closure activities, the DoD and Community Co-chair should coordinate with the BRAC Cleanup Team, the Base Transition Coordinator, and the reuse committee.
2. ...ensure that DoD participates in an open and constructive manner.
3. ...attend all meetings and ensure the RAB has the opportunity to participate in the restoration decision process.
4. ...ensure that community issues and concerns related to restoration are addressed when raised.
5. ...provide relevant policies and guidance documents to the RAB in order to enhance the RAB's operation.
6. ...ensure that adequate administrative support to meet the RAB is provided.
7. ...refer issues not related to restoration to appropriate installation official for them to address.
8. ...report back to the installation. (*Base Reuse Implementation Manual* (1997, pp. F-53-F-55))

The Community Co-chair should:

1. ...coordinate with the DoD Installation Co-chair and RAB community members to prepare an agenda prior to each RAB meeting.
2. ...ensure that community members participate in an open and constructive manner
3. ...ensure that community issues and concerns related to restoration are raised.
4. ...assist with the dissemination of information to the general public.
5. ...report RAB back to the community.
6. ...serve without compensation. (*Base Reuse Implementation Manual* (1997, pp. F-53-F-55))

RAB community members are expected to:

1. ...attend meetings.
2. ...provide advice and comment on restoration issues to the decision makers.
3. ...serve without compensation on the RAB. (*Base Reuse Implementation Manual* (1997, pp. F-53-F-55))

Additionally, RAB community members should:

1. ...represent and communicate community interests and concerns to the RAB.
2. ...act as a conduit for the exchange of information between the community, DoD installation, and environmental oversight agencies regarding the installation's restoration and reuse programs.
3. ...review, evaluate, and comment on documents and other such materials related to installation restoration and closure, where applicable. (*Base Reuse Implementation Manual* (1997, pp. F-53-F-55))

Federal (EPA) and state regulatory agency members should:

1. ...attend meetings.
2. ...serve as an information, referral, and resource bank for communities, installations and agencies regarding installation restoration.
3. ...review documents and other materials related to restoration,
4. ...ensure that federal and/or state environmental standards and regulations are identified and addressed by the DoD installation.
5. ...facilitate flexible and innovative resolutions of environmental issues and concerns.
6. ...assist in education and training for the RAB members. (*Base Reuse Implementation Manual* (1997, pp. F-53-F-55))

The BCT should:

1. ...maintain a close working relationship with other members of the RAB.
2. ...provide timely and accurate information to the RAB. (*Base Reuse Implementation Manual* (1997, pp. F-53-F-55))

F. DIFFICULTIES IMPLEMENTING THE FAST-TRACK CLEANUP PROGRAM AND OPERATING RESTORATION ADVISORY BOARDS

From the *Restoration Advisory Board Report to Congress* (1995), the Defense Environmental Response Task Force (DERTF) shifted its focus from establishing RABs to operating RABs by establishing basic procedures for reviewing and responding to public comment, keeping the community informed, and determining methods for resolution of disputes. Additional initiatives undertaken in FY95 included:

1. Developing the Directory of Restoration Advisory Boards,
2. Beginning the collection of material for a RAB resource book that will provide practical tools for establishing and operating RABs, and
3. Publishing a notice of request in the *Federal Register* for comments about funding options for technical assistance for public.

As reported in *Fast-Track Cleanup: Successes and Challenges, 1993-1995* (1996), a report prepared by the Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Environmental Cleanup), BCTs were established and BRAC Cleanup Plans were completed at 77 closed installations nine months after the presidential plan was announced. In contrast, GAO reported in *Military Bases: Environmental Impact at Closing Installations* (1995), that according to a review of 77 cleanup plans, about one-third of the installations had not yet formed a RAB. Additionally, at installations with a RAB, only half of them participated in developing the BRAC cleanup plans. GAO

(1995) also reported that EPA, in a similar effort to establish advisory boards, had not been able to earn the public's trust due to differing interests, even with the best intentions and community outreach programs. Based on GAO's observations at selected RAB meetings, it appeared that DoD might face similar difficulties.

Other problems facing the Fast-Track Cleanup Program are empowerment of BCTs, a lack of baseline data, and inadequate performance measures. Even though BCTs exist at closing bases to make environmental cleanup decisions and develop cleanup plans, approval of these decisions comes from above the base level. As of December 1994, the only two measures of effectiveness were the percentage of closing bases with completed environmental impact analysis, and the percentage of property at closing bases that could be made available for reuse. (GAO/NSIAD-95-70, 1995)

Recognizing the need for better methods of progress assessment, DoD presented five Measures of Merit (MOM) at a DERTF meeting in May 1996. The first of these MOMs is relative risk categorization. DoD developed the relative risk methodology to provide a stable and quantifiable basis for justifying requirements and allocating funds. This ensures that DoD is able to direct the necessary resources to sites that pose the greatest risk. Relative risk is categorized as High, Medium, Low, Not Evaluated, or Not Required. This MOM tracks both site counts and funding for each relative risk category. Second, progress through the phases of the cleanup program is tracked. All sites are tracked from the investigation phase, through the cleanup phase, and finally to the "Response Complete" or "No Further Action Required" categories. The third MOM is milestones accomplished; these milestones are actions taken toward reducing the relative environmental risk that previous military activities imparted to a site. Fourth, the number

of installations with final remedial actions in place or all cleanup activities complete is counted. Finally, the number of acres suitable for transfer under CERCLA is determined. Since no method has been developed to project the number of acres that will be transferable in a given year, this MOM provides a current and retrospective look at the condition of property. (Defense Environmental Response Task Force, 1997)

G. FORT ORD RESTORATION ADVISORY BOARD

Established in 1917, Fort Ord served as both an infantry training facility and as a staging location for infantry troops throughout its history. Fort Ord was home to various units with the 7th Infantry Division occupying it since 1975. As part of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission's second round of closings, the announcement of Fort Ord's closure came April 1991. In September 1994, Fort Ord officially closed and eliminated 13,600 military and 2,835 civilian jobs (California Trade and Commerce Agency, 1999).

At the time of its closure, Fort Ord covered 28,000 acres. The Federal government retained 15,000 acres, which included the Presidio of Monterey Annex military housing units and land for future transfer to the Bureau of Land Management. With the Federal government retaining over half of the installation, 13,000 acres remained available for transfer through Public Benefit Conveyance (PBC) or Economic Development Conveyance (EDC). The conveyances differ because of the uses for the land and the cost of the land to the new landowner. The land must be used for specific purposes in a PBC and is transferred to the new user at no cost. Examples of agencies or groups eligible for PBCs include Federal Aviation Administration, educational

institutions, or organizations that assist the homeless. In an EDC, as the name implies, the land is to be used for business purposes and is sold by the Federal government at a negotiated price.

As of February 1999, approximately 3,000 acres have been transferred. Most of the transfers have been through PBC to include California State University Monterey Bay, Marina Municipal Airport (formerly Fritzche Army Air Field), and several homeless organizations. The one significant EDC was the sale of two golf courses to the city of Seaside for \$11 million. Despite these transfers, almost 10,000 acres remained available for transfer five years after Fort Ord closed. The extensive environmental cleanup required at Fort Ord was partially responsible for the slow rate of transfer. (California Trade and Commerce Agency, 1999)

The environmental cleanup effort at Fort Ord began before the installation officially closed. In 1990, Fort Ord appeared on the EPA's National Priorities List because of groundwater contamination from the landfills located on the installation. As mandated by Title 10 USC Section 2705, a Technical Review Committee (TRC) formed to investigate the extent of the contamination and to develop a corrective action plan. Representatives from the Department of the Army, EPA, and California EPA comprised the Fort Ord TRC. In total, there were 30 members on the TRC. In 1991, the Army conducted a base-wide investigation and submitted its Record of Decision, or cleanup plan, to the EPA in January 1994. (RAB Meeting Minutes, 07 February 1994)

According to the *Fort Ord BRAC Cleanup Plan Abstract for FY97* (1997), the BCT was formed in September 1993. In compliance with the Fast-Track Cleanup

Program, the BCT conducted a "bottom-up" review of the BRAC Cleanup Plan and completed its review in March 1994.

February 1994, the Army held an open meeting to explain the purpose and responsibilities of a RAB and to request interested persons submit applications to become RAB members. During the meeting, the Army representative announced that seven local mayors and two Monterey County Board of Supervisors representatives had selected the first Community Co-chair. A selection committee would establish criteria for reviewing applications to select 12 primary and six alternates to serve as RAB community members. The selection committee consisted of the Community Co-chair, representatives from the U.S. and California EPA, and two current TRC members. The material presented below is meant to serve as an overview of some of the problems faced by the Fort Ord RAB; a more extensive analysis of these problems is provided in Chapter IV.

The Fort Ord RAB held its first meeting with its new community members in May 1994. According to the minutes, the community members consisted of the Community Co-chair, three representatives from two environmental groups, a retired teacher, a former city council member, a retired Monterey County Health Department worker, a college student, and four individual citizens. The agenda for this meeting was to discuss RAB responsibilities and to draft a mission statement. During the meeting, the Community Co-chair requested that all RAB members operate openly and without hidden agendas.

Based on interviews of RAB members, review of RAB meeting minutes, and newspaper articles, the Fort Ord RAB faced many conflicts, both internal and external, throughout its tenure. In attempts to resolve internal conflicts, the Fort Ord RAB

employed outside facilitation groups on three separate occasions. The first group, Conflict Resolution and Mediation Center of Monterey County, began to assist the Fort Ord RAB in February 1996 at the request of a local Army commander. To facilitate meetings, parliamentary procedures at RAB meetings were employed. RAB members were given copies of *Robert's Rules of Order* to assist in this endeavor. In July 1996, a question of privilege was raised before the Fort Ord RAB because a member was dismissed, in accordance with RAB by-laws, for missing three meetings. This individual missed these meetings because of a personal illness, and a motion was made to reinstate this individual to the RAB. Other RAB members defeated the motion citing that there were no provisions in the by-laws to reinstate members. Shortly after this incident, the neutrality of the Conflict Resolution and Mediation Center of Monterey County was questioned at which time they ceased to provide assistance to the Fort Ord RAB.

At the request of U.S. EPA, Career/Pro began to provide facilitation services in February 1997. From comments in meeting minutes, the Fort Ord RAB was making progress. One member of the RAB stated that she was glad to see RAB members talk "to" each other instead of "at" each other. Any progress that was made ended in September 1997 when a dispute erupted between Army RAB representatives and community RAB members over the September agenda. Career/Pro managed to broker a compromise, but because of conscious and deliberate acts by a RAB member, important presentations concerning cleanup were not made (Houghton, 1997). Because of these actions Career/Pro recommended to disband the Fort Ord RAB in October 1997.

In September 1998, Concur, a third facilitation group, began to assist the Fort Ord RAB at the request of U.S. EPA. Concur conducted special meetings with the RAB prior

to scheduled monthly meetings. Again, progress was being made, but the inability to establish selection criteria for new members and a motion to resolve the question of privilege from 1996 caused the RAB to relapse. After seven months, Concur made its recommendation to disband the Fort Ord RAB in May 1999.

External conflicts also plagued the RAB. The most notable was the lawsuit filed by a RAB member representing an environmental group against the Army, which was then adjudicated by another RAB member. The Army settled the lawsuit by agreeing to follow CERCLA procedures in its cleanup of unexploded ordnance, a process that could delay the transfer of land up to two years.

May 1999, the Army announced its decision concerning the Fort Ord RAB. Citing the RAB's ineffectiveness in providing a forum for the exchange of information and lack of timely advice regarding the environmental cleanup at Fort Ord, the Army, with the support of OSD, Headquarters Department of the Army, and the BCT, disbanded the Fort Ord RAB.

H. SUMMARY

This chapter provides information necessary to understand why the President's Revitalization Initiative was needed, gives an overview of the Five-Point Plan with emphasis placed on the Fast-Track Cleanup Program and the RAB process, and details the implementation of the RAB process at Fort Ord. This background knowledge is necessary to understand the difficulties advisory groups have when trying to provide input on a technical matter, such as environmental cleanup.

III. LITERATURE REVIEW

The advisory nature of a Restoration Advisory Board creates some unique circumstances that must be studied. To provide a conceptual framework for analyzing the general RAB process and the Fort Ord RAB in particular, literature concerning citizen involvement, autonomy of advisory groups, expectations versus reality of advisory group participants, and group conflict resolution were reviewed.

A. CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT

Citizen participation to advise in planning and implementing social programs is not new. Since the 1960s, citizen participation in the form of citizen advisory groups, neighborhood councils, and planning commissions has been used to differing degrees of success. Debate about the value of citizen participation increased greatly with the Economic Recovery Act of 1964 and its "maximum feasible participation" clause (Rosner, 1978). This clause stated that programs would be "...developed, conducted, and administered with the maximum participation of the residents of the areas and members of the groups served." (*Economic Recovery Act, 1964*)

Rosner (1978) notes that researchers are not in agreement about the goals and objectives of citizen participation, or the ability to evaluate its effectiveness. Despite this uncertainty, federal funds are continually allocated to citizen participation programs, such as restoration advisory boards.

According to Kweit and Kweit (1987), there is no place for citizen participation in the ideal bureaucracy. The authors' believe that citizens lack technical expertise, are

unfamiliar with bureaucratic routines, and may be emotionally involved in the issues of concern. Additionally, there is little control over citizens since they are outside the bureaucratic hierarchy, which may increase the level of conflict between citizens and bureaucrats and the time needed to reach decisions. The final result may hamper the efficiency and rationality sought in the ideal bureaucracy.

“Despite hundreds of federal regulations and the expenditure of millions of dollars, participation procedures, such as public hearings and advisory committees, are more often wasteful and useless.” (Cohen, 1995, p. 121) Installation representatives and state and Federal regulators must spend time attending RAB meetings, and the installation must provide administrative support and funding to operate the RAB (DoD, 1998).

Other problems that can plague advisory groups are the credibility of its members and high turnover rates experienced by citizen participation groups. According to Cohen (1995), an advisory group's efforts are enhanced if members represent advocacy groups with significant clout and resources. If the members are unrepresentative, their decisions might be discounted and biased. Kweit and Kweit (1980) state that the credibility of group members is higher if their perceived level of expertise is high, they are able to participate in the bureaucratic process without causing excess delays, and they are perceived as potentially supportive of the sponsoring agency.

According to English (1972), recruitment and high turnover rates are problems encountered by citizen participation groups. Rather than being bombarded with people interested in serving, citizen groups often find membership recruitment difficult and

suffer significant attrition. English (1972) provides several explanations for these problems:

1. Citizens join for personal gain only to lose interest after discovering that it is illegal for a board member or immediate family to gain materially from board actions.
2. Citizens joining a board with the intent of obtaining employment on the supporting staff are successful and must resign from the board due to resulting conflict of interest; or are unsuccessful and leave the board because of lack of interest.
3. Citizens who are interested in joining are prevented from serving because of laws regarding conflicts of interest.
4. Agency appointees, who have no interest in participating, simply do not attend meetings.
5. Members may quit in protest, leave the geographic area, or have more pressing personal matters.

According to Cohen (1995), the role of the advisory group in the decision-making process is also important to the success of the group. Participation programs that give the illusion of importance but merely placate citizens are likely to reduce trust between citizens and the sponsoring agency, diminish communication, cause alienation, and possibly foster community opposition. Coinciding with the role of an advisory group is the point in the process when an advisory group provides its recommendations. If the group merely reacts to proposals formalized by the sponsoring agency, the advisory

group is less likely to change the plan than if the group provides advice before proposals are finalized.

The degree of trust between the advisory group and the sponsoring agency can greatly impact the manner in which formalized plans are received. If the level of trust is substantial, formalized plans can be more readily received, and the decision-making process expedited. However, a lack of trust can cause any proposal submitted by the sponsoring agency to be met with suspicion, impeding or blocking the decision-making process until petty arguments are resolved. Kweit and Kweit (1980) make a related observation that bureaucrats can significantly reduce citizen impact by creating boards composed of disinterested citizens or specifying that participation is "advisory" only.

Kweit and Kweit (1980) also state that the stability or instability of the environment surrounding the issue impacts how the sponsoring agency views citizen participation. If the environment is stable with little opposition, bureaucrats are less likely to incur the costs of citizen participation. Bureaucrats are more likely to incur the costs of integrating citizens into the decision-making process if the environment is unstable with substantial opposition towards the issue.

As discussed, the use of citizen participation increases the cost of the decision-making process by increasing the time involved and the expense of supporting an advisory group, but there are also incentives for bureaucrats to involve citizens. Kweit and Kweit (1987) state that the development and cultivation of a clientele is a useful device for providing political support for programs when budget resources are scarce. Additionally, a good way to develop a clientele is to co-opt citizens by involving them in the decision-making process. As defined in *The American Heritage Dictionary of the*

English Language (1981), co-opting can range from electing as a member of a group to taking over an independent minority or movement through assimilation into an established group or culture. Kweit and Kweit do not define their meaning of co-opt in their 1987 article. The amount of autonomy given to citizen participants may determine which definition of co-optation may be applied to a particular advisory group.

B. AUTONOMY

Houghton (1988) describes citizen participation in the framework of an advisory group as ineffective. In contrast, other authors believe that citizen participation can range from empty rituals to significant exercises of power with positive and negative results (Knaap, Matier, and Olshansky, 1998). Some researchers believe that the level of autonomy the citizen group achieves from its sponsoring agency determines its level of success. Autonomy is defined by Houghton (1988) as the degree to which advisory groups both challenge their sponsoring agency in areas of direct concern to them and also procure their own sources of information and support.

Houghton (1988) measured autonomy using four categories. First, the methods board members used to challenge the sponsoring agency in areas of direct concern to them. In other words, could the board veto or amend recommendations of the sponsoring agency. Second, he asked board members to rate the importance of budget, agency structure, administrative regulation, and staffing for inclusion on the agenda of the board. His findings showed that boards with more control over these items were more autonomous. Third is the degree to which boards collected their own information. Sources of information include formal surveys, public records, conferences, or

independent experts. Houghton found that boards that did not rely on their sponsoring agency for all technical information were more autonomous. Finally, Houghton determined what actions boards take to solicit support for their recommendations. Boards that gathered information to formulate recommendations, and then solicited support for these recommendations were more autonomous. From this research, Houghton concluded that citizen advisory boards could have an impact on policy if their members engage in activities designed to enhance their independence from the sponsoring agency.

According to Knaap, Matier, and Olshansky (1998), another measure of autonomy is an advisory board's ability to broadly represent the community. Although advisory groups may include citizens-at-large, groups not representative of their community limit their ability to provide viable recommendations to the sponsoring agency. To better represent the community, advisory groups should seek representatives of minority populations and neighborhood groups. Advisory groups may include representatives of special interest groups that are active in agency business without the inducements of special involvement programs.

C. EXPECTATIONS VERSUS REALITY

To evaluate citizen participation, it is relevant to determine whether a participation program or activity is perceived as an end in itself, as a means to an end, or a combination of both. In the "healthiest" advisory groups, according to Rosner (1978), both the sponsoring agency and the citizen participants agree on the goals of the participation process, i.e., a cause and effect relationship between the participation

process and the accomplishment of the desired goals is explicit. In this case, the participation process is a means to an end. Contrary to the previous situation, if there is no agreement about the goals and a lack of consensus concerning cause and effect, the participation process is an end in itself. This latter situation is similar to the co-optation previously described by Kweit and Kweit.

Persons selected to participate need to be instructed about what is expected of them, what difficulties and frustrations are likely, and how they can be effective. The sponsoring agency should teach citizen participants about the bureaucratic process, while citizen participants should be teaching bureaucrats about the social and political constraints in the community. The process chosen to select an advisory group affects how it works and what it accomplishes. The selection process should be tailored to the goals being attempted through the use of an advisory group. A balanced approach to evaluating citizen participation needs to include determining what the expectations of both the sponsoring agency and citizens in the process are and how fully the results of that process fulfilled their expectations. (Plumlee, Starling, and Kramer, 1985)

D. CONFLICT

Thomas (1992) defines conflict as a process that begins when one party perceives that another party has negatively affected, or is about to negatively affect, something that the first party cares about. Thomas also describes three general properties shared by differing definitions of conflict. First, there is an interdependence between the parties in the sense that each has the potential to interfere with the other. Second, there is the perception by at least one of the parties that there is some degree of opposition or

incompatibility among the goals of the parties. Finally, there is some form of interaction between the parties.

Thomas (1992) states that conflict occurs as a process or series of events based on structural conditions. The structural conditions shape what Thomas calls conflict episodes, which lead to conflict outcomes. The events in the conflict process are *awareness, thoughts and emotions, intentions, behavior, interaction, and outcomes*.

Awareness is when one of the parties recognizes conflict exists. Thomas goes on to describe three forms of conflict. First, goal conflicts involve apparently incompatible ends desired by each of the parties. Second, judgement conflicts entail differences over empirical or factual issues. Finally, normative conflicts center on one party's evaluation of another party's behavior versus the expectations of how the other should behave.

After a party becomes aware of conflict, it is experienced in terms of that person's *thoughts* that assist in making sense of the conflict and consider ways of dealing with it, as well as *emotions* that interact with those thoughts.

Prior to behaviors, the decision to act in a given way intervenes. Thomas plots these *intentions* along two axes, assertiveness and cooperativeness. Assertiveness is the extent to which an individual attempts to satisfy his/her own concerns, while cooperativeness is the extent to which an individual attempts to satisfy the other's concerns. Varying degrees of assertiveness and cooperativeness yield different conflict management styles.

The styles Thomas describes are *Competing, Accommodating, Compromising, Collaborating, and Avoiding*. *Competing*, for example, is assertive but uncooperative where one individual attempts to prevail over the other, creating a win-lose outcome.

Another example is *Accommodating*, which is cooperative but unassertive, where the desire is to satisfy the other's concerns while ignoring one's own concerns. The ideal style in many situations is *Collaborating*, i.e., individuals are assertive and cooperative, and concerns of both parties are satisfied.

Behaviors are the statements or other observable actions an individual makes during a conflict episode. The other individual, who goes through their own conflict process, responds to these behaviors based on their own dominant style. This *interaction* between individual styles continues, providing each party with varying degrees of conflict resolution.

The purpose of a conflict episode is to arrive at some form of a conflict *outcome*. The *outcome* involves the decision, or lack of decision between parties regarding the conflict issue. Thomas (1992) asserts that the principal parties do most conflict management themselves, unassisted by third parties. Providing the principal parties are effective in resolving their own conflicts, the need for third-party intervention is reduced. The ability to resolve conflict in this manner contributes to an organization's welfare by producing more effective conflict outcomes, and by saving an organization costs in terms of time and money by not having to involve third parties. If the principal parties cannot arrive at an acceptable *outcome*, involvement of a third party may be necessary, i.e., two highly competitive styles may need facilitation towards collaboration.

Robbins (1992) describes conflicts as functional or dysfunctional. Functional conflicts support the goals of the group and improve performance, while dysfunctional conflicts hinder group performance and can be destructive. Constructive conflict improves the quality of decisions, stimulates creativity and innovation, encourages

interest and curiosity among group members, provides the medium through which problems can be aired and tensions released, and fosters an environment of self-evaluation and change.

If left uncontrolled, Robbins (1992) states that dysfunctional conflict retards communication, reduces group cohesiveness, and subordinates group goals to the primacy of infighting among members. "At the extreme, conflict can bring group functioning to a halt and potentially threaten the group's survival." (Robbins, 1992, p.184)

E. SUMMARY

The literature describes some of the challenges citizen advisory groups face and how they can minimize problems or enhance effectiveness (e.g., increased autonomy). Five hypotheses are presented to analyze the RAB process and the Fort Ord RAB. First, the more knowledge an advisory group has about bureaucratic processes and the technical aspects of environmental cleanup, the more likely they are to establish credibility with bureaucrats and effectively fulfill their advisory role. Second, as an advisory group minimizes membership turnover, more time is available to spend on pertinent issues. Third, (using Houghton's definition of autonomy) the more autonomous the advisory group is from its sponsoring agency, the more likely the advisory group is to effectively fulfill their advisory role. Fourth, the greater the alignment of expectations and trust between citizen participants and the sponsoring agency, the more likely the advisory group is to effectively fulfill their advisory role. Finally, an advisory group that is able to

produce meaningful conflict *outcomes*, either among the primary members or with assistance from a third party, is more likely to effectively fulfill their advisory role.

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IV. RESULTS

A. METHODOLOGY

Several methods were used to obtain data to evaluate the hypotheses from Chapter III. These included reviewing archives of Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board (RAB) meeting minutes, attending four Fort Ord RAB meetings, and conducting interviews with both members of the Fort Ord RAB and other people associated with the Fort Ord RAB. Meeting minutes were easily accessible, as several public repositories were available. Fort Ord RAB meetings were open to the public and easily attended. These meetings were scheduled monthly on the second Tuesday at a standard time and location.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted in-person and via telephone with two Army leaders responsible for the transfer of Fort Ord land, an Army environmental cleanup specialist, representatives from U.S. and California EPA, two citizen members of the RAB, the BRAC Transition Coordinator (BTC), and one of the facilitators that assisted the RAB. For the purposes of this chapter, those interviewed were placed into the following groups: Group 1 was Army leaders and Army environmental cleanup specialist, Group 2 was regulatory agency representatives, Group 3 was citizen members of the RAB, and Group 4 was the BTC and facilitator that assisted the RAB.

Due to time constraints, each interview began with verbal administration of a structured questionnaire (see Appendix A). The questions addressed the effectiveness factors identified in the literature review. Initial answers to questions were based on a five-point Likert scale where 1 = "low" on the characteristic being examined and 5 =

“high”. The exception was Question 11, which was based on a three-point scale. If time permitted, follow-on questions were asked to gain more in-depth information. Of nine interviews conducted, five were in-person and four via telephone and follow-on questions were asked in 78 percent of all interviews. To gain further insight into the workings of the RAB, the author presented two open questions just prior to the conclusion of each interview. Each interviewee was asked what primary factors facilitated RAB successes and what primary factors impeded RAB successes.

Obtaining interviews with members of the RAB was difficult because of events that occurred just prior to the requests for interviews. With approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and U.S. EPA, and with the concurrence of the current facilitation group, the Army disbanded the Fort Ord RAB in May 1999. Many citizen members declined an interview because of the controversial nature of the disbanding of the RAB. Others declined to be interviewed until they could discuss their possible participation with other citizen members. Members representing government regulatory agencies hesitated to participate because they did not want their input construed as the opinion of the agency they represented. Some regulatory members agreed to an interview after being reassured that they would not be directly quoted. A promise of anonymity was given to all interviewees and in-person interviews were recorded with the interviewee's permission.

B. CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT

To gather data regarding the importance of citizen involvement, the following four questions were asked.

| | Frequencies of Question Ratings | | | | |
|---|---------------------------------|---|---|---|-----------|
| | Not Necessary | | 3 | 4 | Essential |
| | 1 | 2 | | | 5 |
| Question: <i>How important is citizen participation in the environmental cleanup process at Fort Ord?</i> | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 5 |

Both members of Group 4 rated citizen participation as the midpoint value (3), one member of Group 1 and one member of Group 2 rated the question as (4), and two members of Group 1, one member of Group 2, and both members of Group 3 responded *Essential* (5). While all of the interviewees agreed the need for citizen involvement exists, they did not agree on the reason why.

Responses from representatives of all groups expressed the need for openness between the Army and the surrounding community, the ability to determine the perceptions of the local community, and for citizens to have input into what affects their community. Before the RAB was established, there was the impression that very little if any community outreach existed and establishing the RAB demonstrated that the government was willing to open the process to the public and not operate in a vacuum. Two Group 1 representatives stated that citizen participation was required by CERCLA and that the land would inevitably be turned over to the community. One Group 2 representative stated that if the cleanup process followed the strict guidelines of CERCLA, the needs of the community might be completely overlooked. One Group 3 member simply said that the Army could not be trusted to provide adequate cleanup without citizen involvement.

| | Frequencies of Question Ratings | | | | |
|---|---------------------------------|---|---|------------------|---|
| | Not at All | | | All Major Groups | |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Question: <i>To what extent do you think the RAB represents all major citizen groups?</i> | 4 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 |

Four of the nine interviewees, two Group 1 and two Group 4 members, stated that the representation of major citizen groups was *Not at All* (1), another four, one Group 1, two Group 2, and one Group 3, stated representation as *Less Than Half* (2), and one Group 3 member stated *About Half* (3) of the major citizen groups were represented.

Members involved with the Fort Ord RAB since its inception stated that representation was better in the beginning, but diminished for several reasons. First, arguments over procedural details eventually drove out old members and caused new members to quickly become disillusioned with the process and quit. Second, the increased investment of time caused by procedural arguments became too great for some members. At one point, it was not uncommon for meetings to last for over four hours. For example, one meeting attended by the author took 45 minutes to agree on the agenda for that night's meeting. Unfortunate ramifications from these procedural arguments were that community comments and concerns were not heard because people left before public comment periods began and technical presentations meant to inform the public were either cancelled or presented to RAB members. Third, businesses and cities surrounding the former Fort Ord were never represented on the RAB. The surrounding cities were represented on the Fort Ord Reuse Authority (FORA) Board, which dealt with land distribution issues. Finally, membership on the Fort Ord RAB expanded and

contracted, but membership eventually stabilized with the same few members representing their agendas, which did not necessarily expedite the cleanup process.

The Fort Ord RAB encountered membership problems from the very beginning. From a meeting held in February 1994 and ads placed in local newspapers, only 19 people submitted applications to join the RAB. From these 19 applications, the selection committee selected 11 primary citizen members. Local city mayors and the Monterey County Board of Supervisors selected the first Community Co-chair. Before the end of the first year, the Army Co-chair changed, the Community Co-chair moved out of the area, one member resigned due to family matters, and one member was dropped because of missed meetings.

The RAB, which began in 1994 with a total of 36 members, was only mustering 11 to 16 members by the end of 1995. Because of declining membership, a selection committee was established in February 1995 to develop procedures to select new members. By November 1995, selection procedures still were not developed so the selection committee was disbanded and all applicants were accepted. At this point, membership grew to 50 members, but this did not last long. In March 1996, two original members said that they would not be renewing their membership because they were tired of the bickering among RAB members and the perception of being ignored by the Army. Another member resigned in September 1996 after being selected for a position on the Army Community Relations staff. Throughout the remainder of 1996, 1997, and 1998, membership slowly declined. By February 1999, only 11 members were consistently attending meetings. On occasion, as few as eight members would attend a scheduled monthly meeting.

| | Frequencies of Question Ratings | | | | |
|--|---------------------------------|---|---|----------------|---|
| | Strongly Disagree | | | Strongly Agree | |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Question: <i>Necessary training was provided to the RAB members.</i> | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 |

Both Group 3 members responded *Strongly Disagree* (1). One Group 1 member and one Group 2 member responded *Somewhat Disagree* (2). Group 2 and Group 1 representatives gave responses of Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) and Somewhat Agree (4), respectively. The three *Strongly Agree* (5) responses came from one member of Group 1 and both members of Group 4.

A comprehensive series of lectures provided in 1994 covered aspects of environmental cleanup, risk assessment, groundwater aquifers, and the CERCLA Superfund process. Additionally, the first mediation group provided training in the parliamentary process based on *Robert's Rules of Order*. Based on the response of a Group 2 representative, over \$250,000 were spent on training provided by Concur, the third facilitation group, to assist the RAB in resolving their differences. No additional technical training other than technical presentations at monthly meetings was provided to new members and no follow-on training was provided to previous members. By the time the Fort Ord RAB was disbanded, only two members received the earlier series of lectures. One Group 3 member stated that after the initial set of lectures it was the RAB member's responsibility to obtain additional training.

From multiple Group 1 and Group 2 members, two common themes emerged. It was an unreasonable expectation to teach laypersons something as technical as environmental cleanup and that even after training and technical presentations, some citizen members never reached an effective level of understanding. Even one Group 3

member stated that a RAB member must come in with some level of technical knowledge to understand the process.

In an attempt to streamline lengthy meetings, the Conflict Resolution and Mediation Center of Monterey County conducted a seminar on parliamentary procedures using *Robert's Rules of Order* as the primary teaching tool in February 1996. While this appeared to work at first, *Robert's Rules* became a tool to intimidate those who were not comfortable with parliamentary processes.

The need for training did not rest solely with the citizen members of the RAB. The BTC stated that government employees who were going to be placed into positions where they dealt with the public, especially on issues as potentially emotional as environmental cleanup, should receive training in crisis communication skills. If this type of training was not available, a communication specialist, such as a trained facilitator, should be used from the beginning. From personal observations of RAB meetings and review of meeting transcripts, citizen members could also benefit from this type of training because, on multiple occasions, RAB citizen members openly argued among themselves, as well as with members of the community during public comment periods.

| | Frequencies of Question Ratings | | | | | |
|--|---------------------------------|--------|---|---|-----------|-------------|
| | Empty | Ritual | | | Essential | No Response |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Question: <i>How would you describe the role of the RAB?</i> | 4 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 |

This is how this question appeared on the questionnaire. However, in the interview process each respondent was requested to answer in regards to the Fort Ord

RAB. Although this question referred to citizen involvement, it was one of the last questions asked because of possible resentment and repercussions from the person being interviewed. Two Group 1 members, one Group 2 member, and one Group 4 member responded *Empty Ritual* (1). One Group 4 member responded *Symbolic* (2) and one Group 2 member responded *Necessary* (3). Both Group 3 members responded that the role of the Fort Ord RAB was *Essential* (5). One Group 1 member did not respond to this question. Two respondents, one from Group 1 and the other from Group 4, stated that some of the current citizen members were radical elements with their own political agenda to stop development at the former Fort Ord. One Group 2 representative even stated that attending meetings for the last six months was a complete waste of time because of the personalities involved.

When asked what could be done to shift the RAB to a more substantive role, several suggestions were given. First, if the medium for citizen involvement continued to be a RAB, reduced procedural arguing and the elimination of hostility were necessary to allow members to participate openly. Second, a neutral third party should assist in establishing by-laws and procedures, and then ensure that they were followed. Third, all members should sign a commitment sheet that clearly defines the duties and responsibilities of the RAB that clearly stated it was not a decision-making body, but a conduit between the military service and the surrounding community, as stated earlier in Chapter II. Fourth, attempt to attract people with more technical knowledge about environmental cleanup to participate in the process. Finally, move away from the concept of a RAB altogether and establish some other forum to provide community outreach and involvement.

C. AUTONOMY

Using indicators of autonomy presented in Chapter III, questions were asked concerning involvement in the environmental cleanup planning process, the "advisory" nature of the RAB, control of agenda, and sources of information.

| | Frequencies of Question Ratings | | | | | |
|--|---------------------------------|---|---|----------------|---|-------------|
| | Not Involved | | | Fully Involved | | No Response |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Question: <i>On average, to what extent has the RAB been involved in the development of the BRAC Cleanup Plan?</i> | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |

Of those that responded, six answered *Somewhat Involved* (2) or lower. These included one Group 1 member, both Group 2 members, one Group 3 member, and both Group 4 members. One member of Group 1 responded *Moderately Involved* (3), one member of Group 3 responded *Strongly Involved* (4), and one Group 1 member did not respond to this question.

Two respondents gave their answer as *Not Involved* (1) because the cleanup plan was already formulated before the RAB existed. Fort Ord was placed on the U.S. EPA National Priorities List in 1991 because of groundwater contamination, which required a Technical Review Committee to develop a cleanup plan before the formation of the RAB in 1994. One Group 1 member stated that the RAB was *Fully Involved* (5) earlier in the cleanup planning process, but lessened to *Somewhat Involved* (2) in the last two years. The Group 1 member that did not provide an answer from the scale said that the RAB did not provide much productive input and that meetings evolved into squabbles among individuals. One Group 2 member based his response of *Somewhat Involved* (2) on the fact that little of what the RAB provided was within regulatory limits.

| | Frequencies of Question Ratings | | | | | |
|--|---------------------------------|---|---|----------------------------|---|-------------|
| | Never or Almost Never | | | Always or Almost Always | | No Response |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Question: <i>To what extent did the BRAC Cleanup Team implement RAB recommendations?</i> | 5 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |

One Group 1 respondent answered *Greater Than Half the Time* (4), but clarified his answer by saying that was early in the process. As time passed, the RAB provided no inputs for the BRAC Cleanup Team to implement. Of the remaining eight interviewees, one Group 1 member did not respond to the question while the remainder answered *Less Than Half the Time* (2) or lower. Those that answered Never or Almost Never (1) were one Group 1 member, one Group 2 member, both members of Group 3, and one Group 4 member.

During the early days of the RAB, both members of Group 2 stated that the RAB provided few inputs to the BRAC Cleanup Team, but those inputs were not within legal boundaries. Because of the hostile nature of this RAB, members would often times provide inputs outside the regular forum of the RAB and directly contact the Army Environmental Office. Examples of this type of input were the Safety Alert brochure (see Appendix B) and warning signs which were posted in English and Spanish because of the large population of Spanish-speaking residents in the area.

Another method used by individual RAB members to influence cleanup efforts at Fort Ord was filing a lawsuit against the Army in 1997. The lawsuit was filed by a representative of a local environmental group represented on the Fort Ord RAB, and was litigated by the presiding Community Co-chair of the Fort Ord RAB. The lawsuit contended that CERCLA cleanup procedures used to cleanup groundwater contamination

should also be applied to the cleanup of unexploded ordnance. The major debate focused on whether unexploded ordnance was considered hazardous material or hazardous waste.

The Army argued that unexploded ordnance was a hazardous material. Therefore, DoD procedures to locate and properly dispose of unexploded ordnance applied. The plaintiffs argued that unexploded ordnance was a hazardous waste, and since Fort Ord was already on the National Priorities List, CERCLA procedures applied. Before the judge could make a ruling, the Army agreed, in October 1998, to follow CERCLA cleanup procedures as they applied at Fort Ord. By agreeing to the conditions of the lawsuit, the Army delayed transfer of any Fort Ord land for at least two years so that a base wide Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) could be conducted under the auspices of CERCLA. Additionally, the Army avoided a ruling that could establish a precedence applying CERCLA procedures to all unexploded ordnance cleanup projects throughout the country.

| | Frequencies of Question Ratings | | | | |
|---|---------------------------------|---|---|---|-------------------|
| | Strongly Disagree | | | | Strongly Agree |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Question: <i>The "advisory" nature of the RAB (i.e., no decision authority) significantly reduces its impact on the cleanup effort at Fort Ord.</i> | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 |

Two Group 1 members responded *Strongly Disagree* (1) while the third Group 1 member, one Group 2 member, and one Group 3 member responded *Somewhat Disagree* (2). Of those remaining, one Group 4 member Neither Agreed nor Disagreed (3), one Group 2 member Somewhat Agreed (4), and one Group 3 member and one Group 4 member *Strongly Agreed* (5).

The Group 2 member that Somewhat Agreed (4) that the RAB's impact was reduced also stated that almost any group of laypersons could create problems if they held authority over the EPA with regard to technical cleanup issues. One Group 4 member said that the initial intent of a RAB being "advisory" was a good idea. However, that initial intent was lost with the current members of the Fort Ord RAB because they saw themselves as a decision-making body, not as a conduit of information to the surrounding communities. One Group 3 member stated that the Army did not take the RAB serious, which significantly reduced the RAB's impact.

When asked what could be done to increase the RAB's impact on cleanup efforts, one member each from Groups 1, 2, and 4 responded that an increase in the technical knowledge of environmental cleanup by citizen members would increase the RAB's impact. Increased technical knowledge would allow citizen members to formulate substantial inputs and establish rational arguments to support these inputs. In its current state, a lack of technical knowledge fostered a lack of trust of the Army and regulatory agencies, which led to an adversarial relationship among citizen members, the Army, and regulatory agencies.

One Group 3 member felt that since the RAB did not have access to the BRAC Cleanup Team (BCT), which is the decision-making body concerning cleanup issues at Fort Ord, all cleanup decisions were made before the RAB could provide inputs. He stated that better access to the BCT would increase the impact of the RAB.

| | Frequencies of Question Ratings | | | | | |
|---|---------------------------------|---|---|----------------------------|---|-------------|
| | Never or Almost Never | | | Always or Almost Always | | No Response |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Question: <i>The RAB controls its own agenda...</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 |

The two responses on the lower half of the scale, *Never or Almost Never* (1) and *Less than Half the Time* (2), were from Group 3 members. The remaining responses from Groups 1, 2, and 4 ranged from *About Half the Time* (3) to *Always or Almost Always* (5) with one Group 1 member, both Group 2 members, and one Group 4 member in the highest category. One Group 1 member did not respond to the question.

Many comments from follow-up questions revealed that the RAB had almost complete control of the agenda even though one Group 3 representative stated that the RAB only controlled non-substantive or procedural matters, and accused the Army of undermining the RAB. According to a Group 4 member, the only agenda item required by the Army for each meeting was a technical presentation on a cleanup issue to inform the public. One Group 1 representative stated that the RAB controlled the agenda to the point of dysfunction. The Army had the responsibility of compiling inputs for monthly meeting agendas, but inputs were often received late, which meant that members usually did not see the agenda until the meeting. Another Group 1 representative stated that because of arguments over the agenda, technical presentations were either delayed until most of the public left the meeting or cancelled. Finally, one Group 4 member felt that the Army relinquished too much control early in the process and could never regain that control without being accused of trying to prevent RAB progress.

While there is a disagreement about who controlled the agenda, a review of RAB meeting minutes showed that there were some items normally discussed on agendas that the RAB did not control. These items were the operating budget for the RAB, administrative support for the RAB, and location of RAB meetings. According to meeting minutes, questions about funding arose as early as August 1994. From what can be gathered from meeting minutes, the Army did not provide budget information until April 1996. Even then, RAB members did not control how the budget was spent. When the RAB was first established, a court reporter was used to provide transcripts of all RAB meetings. In April 1995, transcripts were no longer provided. When questioned as to why, the Army stated that there was a lack of money to continue using a court reporter to transcribe meetings. In January 1998, a motion passed to tape record RAB meetings so that members could listen to what was said and compare that to the summary minutes of a meeting. Another example of how the lack of budget control affected the RAB arose during the October 1994 meeting. A RAB member requested to hire an independent technical advisor to review documents, but was told that there was no money.

The Army's Environmental Center staff at Fort Ord provided both technical and administrative support to the RAB. But some RAB members did not trust the Army or anyone who worked for the Army, so the available support was under utilized.

Another aspect the Army had complete control of was the location of meetings. During the final months of the RAB, the Army used this power to limit the length of meetings because the room had to be vacated by a specific time. RAB members also complained of not having a location where they could hold committee meetings or review

documents. The Army stated that Environmental Center spaces could be used, but only during normal working hours.

| | Frequencies of Question Ratings | | | | | |
|---|---------------------------------|---|---|----------------------------|---|-------------|
| | Never or Almost Never | | | Always or Almost Always | | No Response |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Question: <i>To what extent does the RAB gather its own information, in addition to the information provided by the Army (surveys, attend conferences, consult technical experts, or consult groups)?</i> | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 |

The division of answers to this question provided some information. One Group 1 member, one Group 2 member, and both Group 4 members responded *Never or Almost Never* (1) or *Less than Half the Time* (2). One Group 2 member responded *Greater than Half the Time* (4) and both Group 3 members responded *Always or Almost Always* (5). Two Group 1 members did not respond to this question.

The most often mentioned source of outside information was that made available through the \$50,000 Technical Assistance Grant (TAG) provided to an environmental group whose executive director was a member of the RAB. This grant, given to the environmental group under CERCLA, was used to hire technical assistants that reviewed documents provided by the Army. Since this grant was specifically provided to the environmental group, its use was not controlled by the RAB. Finally, some members attended National RAB Caucus meetings where they gathered information from other active RABs.

| | Frequencies of Question Ratings | | | | | |
|--|---------------------------------|---|---|----------------------------|---|-------------|
| | Never or Almost Never | | | Always or Almost Always | | No Response |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| Question: <i>To what extent does the RAB seek input and support from its constituents for its recommendations?</i> | 5 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Much like the previous question, all Group 1 members, one Group 2 member, and both Group 4 members responded *Never or Almost Never* (1) or *Less than Half the Time* (2) while both Group 3 members responded *Greater than Half the Time* (4) or *Always or Almost Always* (5). One Group 2 member did not respond to this question. While some citizen members of the RAB represented small groups, such as Fort Ord Toxics Project and Environmental Justice, others were simply individuals with no affiliation to a particular group. The only other group represented by citizen members during the last years of the RAB was the Monterey County Health Department.

D. EXPECTATIONS

Questions in this section were asked to determine to what extent reality matched the expectations of RAB members by examining their understanding of RAB goals.

| | Frequencies of Question Ratings | | | | |
|--|---------------------------------|---|-------------------|---|---|
| | Strongly Disagree | | Strongly Agree | | |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Question: <i>The role of RAB members (as a group) is clearly understood?</i> | 4 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| Question: <i>The role of RAB members (as individuals) is clearly understood?</i> | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 |

This question started as a single question asking if the RAB, as a group, clearly understood its role in the cleanup effort at Fort Ord. After the first two interviewees asked if this question was in reference to the group or the individual, answers to both questions were taken, and the previous interviewees were contacted to provide a response as an individual member. The results of these questions were quite different.

When asked if the individual member clearly understood their role as a RAB member, all respondents answered *Strongly Agree* (5). When asked if the RAB as a group understood their role, two Group 1 members, one Group 2 member, and one Group 4 member answered *Strongly Disagree* (1). One Group 4 member answered *Somewhat Disagree* (2). One Group 2 member and one Group 3 member answered *Neither Agree nor Disagree* (3). Finally, one Group 1 member and one Group 3 member answered *Somewhat Agree* (4).

The question became, "If as individuals everyone knew their role, why did the group not know its role?" One reason suggested by two Group 1 members was that the Fort Ord RAB wanted to be a regulatory or decision-making body when their only role was to be an advisory group. One Group 2 member stated that some members knew their role and those that disagreed with this role used procedural bickering to gain an advantage over the rest of the group.

Part of what undermined the oneness of purpose was the fact that the groups and individuals involved with the RAB represented many different priorities. A few of these priorities included concern about damage to the ocean caused by run-off, groundwater contamination caused by landfills, minority representation, and the impact of controlled burns, used as part of the unexploded ordnance disposal process, on plants, animals, and

air quality. The final reason given by a Group 3 member was that there were many new members on the RAB that never received necessary training to understand the role of the RAB.

| | Frequencies of Question Ratings | | | |
|---|---------------------------------|---|------------|-------------|
| | Vague | | Very Clear | |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | No Response |
| Question: <i>How clear are RAB goals?</i> | 0 | 3 | 5 | 1 |

Of all of the questions, this is the only question with three possible responses. One Group 1 member and both Group 3 members answered *Somewhat Clear* (2). One Group 1 member, both Group 2 members, and both Group 4 members answered *Very Clear* (3). One Group 1 member did not respond to this question.

The goals of any RAB were clearly delineated, as stated in Chapter II. One Group 1 member stated this very fact. One Group 2 member stated that RABs were established to be advisory bodies to provide individual input to the BCT and provide information to the public. The Fort Ord RAB lost sight of these goals. Because of their desire to be a decision-making body that required a vote on inputs, one Group 1 member and one Group 2 member pointed out that this violated the DoD policy that established their very existence. One Group 3 member stated that he clearly understood that the RAB's role was to provide advice to the Army, but felt that the requirement to provide "meaningful" advice was unclear.

| | Frequencies of Question Ratings | | | | |
|---|---------------------------------|---|---|---|--------------|
| | Never | | | | Continuously |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Question: <i>How often has the RAB assessed its progress?</i> | 4 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 |

Two Group 1 members and both Group 4 members responded *Never* (1), one Group 1 member, one Group 2 member, and one Group 3 member responded *Once or Twice* (2), one Group 2 member responded *Occasionally* (3), and one Group 3 member responded *Frequently* (4).

Representatives from Groups 1, 2, and 4 noted that the RAB itself did not assess its progress, but that facilitation groups assessed the Fort Ord RAB's progress. The results of those assessments were that the Fort Ord RAB had not made any significant progress in the entire time it was established. One Group 1 respondent even stated that the RAB knew that they were ineffective and did not conduct self-assessments for fear of being dissolved. A couple of respondents were not sure of any assessments, but one Group 3 member stated that the Army ensured no self-assessments were conducted to keep the RAB from becoming an effective body.

E. CONFLICT

Evidence from early meetings leads one to believe that there would be quite a struggle for the RAB to agree on any issue. During the first meeting in February 1994, a future RAB citizen member read a letter he drafted that stated public interests would not be served if anyone currently associated with Fort Ord were allowed to participate in the cleanup effort. Six questions were asked to identify some of the sources of conflict and to assess the level of conflict present in the Fort Ord RAB.

| | Frequencies of Question Ratings | | | | |
|--|---------------------------------|---|---|----------------------------|---|
| | Never or Almost Never | | 3 | Always or Almost Always | |
| | 1 | 2 | | 4 | 5 |
| Question: <i>To what extent do RAB members agree about the goals of the RAB?</i> | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Of the four that responded *Never or Almost Never* (1), two were members of Group 1 and two were members of Group 2. The two that responded *Less Than Half the Time* (2) were members of Group 1 and Group 2. Each of the remaining categories, *About Half the Time* (3), *Greater Than Half the Time* (4), and *Always or Almost Always* (5), received one response each from a member of Group 3, Group 2, and Group 3, respectively.

After the transfer of land to California State University, Monterey Bay, RAB citizen members were displeased about not being informed of the transfer and talk of litigation against the Army was mentioned during the August 1994 meeting. The goal of the RAB was not to determine land transfer issues. The land transferred to California State University, Monterey Bay was already determined to be environmentally safe for transfer by the TRC, which established in 1991.

| | Frequencies of Question Ratings | | | | |
|--|---------------------------------|---|---|----------------------------|---|
| | Never or Almost Never | | 3 | Always or Almost Always | |
| | 1 | 2 | | 4 | 5 |
| Question: <i>To what extent do RAB members agree about the priority of the goals of the RAB?</i> | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 1 |

Unlike the previous question, all but one response to this question was on the negative side of the spectrum. All three members of Group 1 and one member of Group 4 responded *Never or Almost Never* (1). Both members of Group 2, one member of

Group 3, and one member of Group 4 responded *Less Than Half the Time* (2). One member of Group 3 responded *Always or Almost Always* (5).

Frequencies of Question Ratings

| | Never or Almost Never | | | Always or Almost Always | |
|---|--------------------------|---|---|----------------------------|---|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Question: <i>To what extent do RAB members agree about the means to achieve the goals of the RAB?</i> | 4 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 0 |

The results of this question were identical to the previous question with the exception that the Group 3 member that responded *Always or Almost Always* (5) on the previous question responded *Greater Than Half the Time* (4) on this question.

Interviewees were then asked to provide examples of how agreement or disagreement increased or impeded RAB effectiveness. The best and most visible example of disagreement impeding effectiveness is the lawsuit mentioned earlier in this Chapter. Even after the Army consented to the conditions of the lawsuit and was presenting its interpretation of the judge's opinion, a RAB citizen member walked out of the meeting because she did not agree with the Army's interpretation. Another example of impeding effectiveness was when RAB members could not agree on who would be the chairperson of the Unexploded Ordnance committee. Instead of working together to resolve the issue, two separate committees were formed and operated independently of each other.

Other examples stem from the continuous procedural bickering among RAB members. First, arguments over meeting agendas sometimes took 45 minutes to finalize. Second, there appeared to be a lack of respect for order, as well as other members.

During the October 1994 meeting, the reporter commented 11 times for people to speak one at a time. There were also many discussions "off the record" in transcripts of meetings until April 1995 when funding was no longer provided to use a reporter. Finally, RAB voting members spent many hours arguing to pass two formal resolutions presented to the Army. However, these resolutions violated EPA regulations and could not be acted upon by the Army.

| | Frequencies of Question Ratings | | | | |
|---|---------------------------------|---|----------------------------|---|---|
| | Never or Almost Never | | Always or Almost Always | | |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Question: <i>Formal meeting and participation procedures are followed by the RAB...</i> | 3 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 1 |

Two Group 1 members and one Group 4 member responded *Never or Almost Never* (1). Both Group 2 members and one Group 4 member responded *Less Than Half the Time* (2). Both Group 3 members responded *About Half the Time* (3) and the last Group 1 member responded *Always or Almost Always* (5). This final Group 1 member further explained his answer by saying that the RAB followed formal procedures to their own detriment. For example, instead of submitting both sides of an issue, they would argue until a consensus was obtained. This arguing and procedural dueling drove members away causing high attrition, which further decreased the RAB's ability to set priorities and conduct self-assessments. One Group 3 member accused the Army of allowing procedural bickering to continue in an effort to eventually disband the RAB.

Initially, *Robert's Rules of Order* allowed the RAB to move past petty arguments and kept members from talking over one another. However, *Robert's Rules of Order*

evolved into a tool used to intimidate others or procedurally cripple the RAB, which distracted members away from the goals of the RAB. An example of this type of distraction was the Question of Privilege filed by one citizen member against other citizen members. The Question of Privilege was filed in August 1996 accusing members of conspiracy to undermine the RAB, gross negligence, and flagrant abuse of RAB by-laws. This issue, placed with the Procedures Committee in December 1996, continued to be a major point of contention in February 1999. The member accused of these wrongdoings wanted closure on this issue, but was told by the Procedures Committee chairman, who was also the person that filed the charges, that the committee had not yet ruled on this issue. A Group 4 member stated that some RAB members orchestrated walkouts to eliminate a quorum needed for an official vote on an issue. This Group 4 member also stated that interpersonal conflicts combined with a lack of trust of the Army increased adversarial relationships within the RAB and decreased effectiveness. However, even if the RAB did get bogged down in procedural arguments, it was a forum to voice opinions that were sometimes acted upon, such as stopping prescribed burns until more information could be gathered.

| | Frequencies of Question Ratings | | | | |
|---|---------------------------------|---|-----------|---|---|
| | Very Low | | Very High | | |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Question: <i>The RAB's appreciation of the Army's point of view is...</i> | 5 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 |

All three Group 1 members and Both Group 4 members responded *Very Low* (1), both Group 2 members responded *Low* (2) and *Neutral* (3), and both Group 3 members responded *High* (4). One Group 1 representative responded that early in the process RAB appreciation was high, but as the process continued that appreciation declined and

currently was *Low* (2). Another Group 1 representative simply stated that the RAB did not respect the Army or its point of view. The third Group 1 member responded that while she thought the overall appreciation was *Low* (2), there were some individual members of the RAB that had a high appreciation of the Army's point of view.

There were several reasons why some RAB members had a low appreciation of the Army. First, RAB members felt that the Army was withholding information from RAB committees, which decreased their ability to provide input. This general distrust of the Army by some RAB members increased after the lawsuit was filed and the Army became more suspicious about being forthcoming with requested information. Second, steps taken by Army representatives on the RAB to get approval from their Chain of Command were interpreted as intentionally delaying the process or manipulation of the process. Finally, as early as October 1994, RAB members were suspicious of the Army and other regulatory agencies because they felt that they would be overruled on issues because there were only 13 citizen members and 23 Army and regulatory agency representatives.

When asked what could be done to increase the RAB's appreciation of the Army's position, several options were provided. The simplest input was to just have RAB members be decent and respect each other and stop personal attacks. Bringing in a community leader that RAB members trusted as the Community Co-chair was recommended. Another suggestion was to clearly explain the written goals of the RAB and provide measures of performance so that the RAB could make self-assessments. Finally, going back to a previous section, was the suggestion that the RAB needed more technically savvy members. One Group 4 member was not as optimistic. She stated that

there was no way appreciation for the Army could be increased with the current group of people associated with the RAB. In support of this statement, one Group 3 member stated that the Army was good at making enemies and that his distrust of the Army increased his resolve to fight.

| | Frequencies of Question Ratings | | | | |
|---|---------------------------------|---|---|---|----------------|
| | Very Low 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | Very High 5 |
| Question: <i>The Army's appreciation of the RAB's input is...</i> | 3 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 1 |

Two Group 1 members and one Group 4 member responded *Very Low* (1). One Group 2 member, both Group 3 members, and one Group 4 member responded *Low* (2). One Group 2 member responded *Neutral* (3) and the last Group 1 member responded *Very High* (5). Two Group 1 representatives stated that the Army received no usable input from the RAB even after spending approximately \$50,000 on training and over \$100,000 for one of the facilitation groups. Of the other two facilitation groups involved with the RAB, Monterey County provided one at no charge and the U.S. EPA paid for the third. One Group 1 member stated that it was difficult for RAB members to display any form of cooperation with the Army because they were met with hostility from other members. Because of this, inputs were not openly presented to the Army. One Group 4 member questioned why the Army should appreciate RAB inputs when the Army was sued, setup, and used by the RAB to further personal agendas. One Group 3 member stated that the Army did not consider the RAB important, and therefore, ignored RAB inputs. As early as October 1994, one RAB citizen member said that the only reason the Army established a RAB was because higher authorities told them to do so.

When asked what could be done to increase the Army's appreciation of the RAB, several suggestions were presented. First, if there were more technically oriented people on the RAB, then more technical discussions could be conducted regarding cleanup issues. At times, the Army was not unwilling to discuss issues with the RAB, but unable to because of the highly technical nature of the issue. Second, take personal agendas and emotions out of RAB discussions and have members come to meetings with open minds and prepared to have healthy discussions about environmental cleanup issues. Third, change the goal of the RAB away from transfer of land as quickly as possible. By having the aura of urgency surrounding environmental cleanup, citizen members became suspicious that shortcuts would be taken, which could adversely affect their well being. Finally, the Army should maintain some form of control over how the RAB is operated so that the RAB does not become mired with personal issues.

V. DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

1. Citizen Involvement

Hypothesis: As an advisory group minimizes membership turnover, more time is available to spend on pertinent issues.

The Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board (RAB) was plagued with membership problems from the very beginning. First, despite advertisements and a public meeting to publicize the formation of the Fort Ord RAB, only 19 applications were received to select the initial cadre of 11 citizen members. Second, high attrition was a problem with the Fort Ord RAB throughout its existence, which created additional ramifications. While early RAB members received technical and parliamentary procedure training, only two of those members remained when the RAB was disestablished. The only methods of obtaining technical information after the initial series of lectures were through self-study or technical presentations at monthly RAB meetings. Unfortunately, because of procedural and petty arguing at monthly meetings, technical presentations were often cancelled, denying new RAB members valuable training. Finally, realizing the need to increase membership, a selection committee was established in February 1995 to determine criteria for selection of new members. After nine months, the selection committee could not agree on selection criteria. At this point, the selection committee was disbanded and all applicants were accepted regardless of any previous involvement in working with groups or technical knowledge of environmental cleanup.

Because of continuous fluctuations in membership, the Fort Ord RAB needed to revisit many technical issues to continually update new members, which hindered its ability to move forward on many of the issues involved with environmental cleanup.

Hypothesis: The more knowledge an advisory group has about bureaucratic processes and the technical aspects of environmental cleanup, the more likely they are to establish credibility with bureaucrats and effectively fulfill their advisory role.

A lack of understanding of bureaucratic processes was evident in several ways. First, since procedural knowledge of how to conduct a meeting was low, *Robert's Rules of Order* was given to RAB members to help them better understand this process. The outcomes of this were members quoting the procedures during the meeting to intimidate members less familiar with these procedures, which reduced participation in meetings. Second, the author witnessed several additional examples of procedural difficulties encountered by the RAB. These examples include taking in excess of 45 minutes to agree on an agenda, openly arguing among RAB members with the public present, and arguing with members of the public during public comment periods. Third, the Fort Ord RAB could not follow the mandate that established the "advisory" board. Instead of providing individual inputs as stated in the Presidential Revitalization Plan, RAB members continued to argue among themselves until a consensus was obtained. From interviews with both citizen members and agency representatives, the Fort Ord RAB's inability to get past procedural issues, such as requiring a consensus, kept them from providing recommendations regarding environmental cleanup issues. Finally, in order to adhere to by-laws, they must first be drafted and adopted. Despite their formation in May 1994, RAB by-laws were not formally adopted until January 1995, after the seventh

revision. According to the by-laws, a member must reapply for membership after a two-year term. When a member failed to reapply and was not allowed to participate in the meeting by the facilitator who was working with the RAB, it was viewed as a power play by the Army to undermine the RAB.

Regarding environmental cleanup, the RAB needed as much technical training as possible since few of the members had any knowledge or experience in this area prior to becoming a member. Yet because of the procedural infighting that occurred on a continual basis, many early members that received training were no longer RAB members and new members could not receive technical presentations because of time constraints placed on meetings.

2. Autonomy

Hypothesis: The more autonomous the advisory group is from its sponsoring agency, the more likely the advisory group is to effectively fulfill their advisory role.

Continuing to use Houghton's (1988) model of autonomy from Chapter III, the Fort Ord RAB was assessed as to how effective it was in meeting those measures. First, the Fort Ord RAB was able to amend or veto Army recommendations regarding environmental cleanup, but not without difficulty. The Fort Ord RAB had to overcome the fact that the BRAC Cleanup Plan for Fort Ord was already completed prior to the RAB even being established. Within the forum of the RAB, members were able to force the Army to reevaluate its policy on controlled burns to clear areas prior to cleanup and by having safety brochures printed in both English and Spanish, rather than English alone. Indirectly, it was a RAB member outside the forum of the RAB that had the

greatest impact, which was the lawsuit mentioned in Chapter IV. Second, with regard to control of the agenda, there was a substantial difference of opinion between community members and agency representatives. Community members stated that they had full control of non-substantive or procedural issues on the agenda. On the other hand, Army and agency representatives stated that community members had full control of the agenda with the exception of technical presentation. This was detrimental to the RAB because procedural bickering over proposed agendas led to some of the problems stated in the previous section. Items missing from RAB agendas were issues of budget, structure and staffing. The mandate that established RABs allowed no control over budget, structure of the RAB, or staffing. The RAB authored its own by-laws, but these were often ignored. Third, the Fort Ord RAB did not demonstrate its ability to gather its own information.

From interviews and review of meeting minutes, most of the RAB members relied heavily on the Army, U.S. EPA, and California EPA for technical information. A lone exception was when an environmental group with representation on the RAB gathered independent information and was also given a Technical Assistance Grant by the U.S. EPA to hire an independent expert to review documents provided by the Army. Citizen members contended that they gathered their own information, but provided vague responses when pressed by the Army or EPA for their sources. This reduced their ability to formulate and substantiate viable recommendations. Finally, few RAB members represented community or special interest groups to draw support for their recommendations. Many simply acted as individuals representing their own personal views and not a true representation of the community, which was noted by Knapp, Matier, and Olshansky (1998) in Chapter III as a hindrance to group effectiveness.

Because the Fort Ord RAB could not gain any substantial amount of autonomy from the Army, through their own actions and because of the mandates that formed all RABs, they were unable to provide useful recommendations, which decreased their effectiveness.

3. Expectations and Trust

Hypothesis: The greater the alignment of expectations and trust between citizen participants and the sponsoring agency, the more likely the advisory group is to effectively fulfill their advisory role.

Using Rosner's (1978) views on expectations and cause and effect from Chapter III, the following conclusions were drawn regarding the Fort Ord RAB. First, citizen members of the RAB had their own agendas, which took priority over the common objective of cleaning Fort Ord for transfer to the community. Examples of individual agendas that plagued the Fort Ord RAB were that certain board members had individual concerns that revolved around unexploded ordnance, rainwater run-off, habitat and wildlife preservation, and lack of minority representation. The more individuals from these groups argued, the more frustrated other members became, which contributed to high membership attrition discussed earlier. Second, citizen members of the RAB continually attempted to be a decision-making body despite being clearly stated in the mandate that RABs would be "advisory" and provide individual input; thus representing a failure in expectations. Finally, contributing to this difference of expectations was the lack of trust between the Army and citizen members of the RAB.

For the most part, citizen members did not believe that the Army was keeping their best interests in mind, only wanted to transfer land as quickly as possible and created the RAB because they were ordered to do so. At the same time, the Army became more leery of providing information because of the lawsuit filed by one of the RAB members and voiced the opinion that the land would eventually be turned over to civilian use. More of this distrust was also evident by reasons given for the lack of RAB self-assessments. Army representatives claimed that RAB members did not want to assess themselves because it would show how ineffective they were, and RAB members claimed that the Army prevented them from conducting assessments, thus inhibiting their ability to become an effective body.

Even though interviewees responded that citizen participation in the environmental cleanup process at Fort Ord ranged from *Necessary* to *Essential*, the role of the RAB in the cleanup of Fort Ord was described by the majority as an *Empty Ritual* or *Symbolic*. So while citizen participation in the form of a RAB was initially seen as a means to environmentally cleaning Fort Ord, the reality was that the RAB became an end in itself with at most symbolic objectives.

4. Conflict

Hypothesis: An advisory group that is able to produce meaningful conflict outcomes, either among the primary members or with assistance from a third party, is more likely to effectively fulfill their advisory role.

Using Thomas' (1992) model to describe conflict processes augmented with Robbins' (1992) definitions of functional and dysfunctional conflict, interactions between

Army representatives and RAB citizen members were analyzed. First, all three general properties of conflict exist in the Fort Ord RAB. Each group had the potential to interfere with the other, there was opposition among goals, and creating the RAB formed interactions among these groups. Second, not only was there conflict regarding goals of the RAB, but judgement and normative conflicts, as well (Thomas, 1992). From results of interviews, the majority stated that the RAB could not agree on the goals. The Army wanted to environmentally cleanup Fort Ord to transfer land to civilian use, while RAB citizen members championed their individual agendas using the forum of the RAB to do so. The best example of judgmental conflict, or means to achieve goals stemmed from the use of controlled burns to initially clear areas before searching for unexploded ordnance, which was the preferred method of the Army. This met with opposition from RAB members who felt that mechanical clearing methods should be used instead. Normative conflicts revealed themselves in interviews from both Army and regulatory agency representatives and citizen members. From Army and regulatory agency representatives, the lack of technical knowledge of citizen members simply impeded their ability to complete any environmental cleanup actions. From citizen members, their distrust of the Army made them challenge the Army because they did not believe that the Army had their best interests in mind.

The third property of conflict was evident in the parties' management of conflict. Specifically, the styles of managing conflict by the Army and citizen members of the RAB did not combine well to arrive at workable outcomes without outside assistance. The Army tried not to be confrontational with RAB members, but in the process lost its ability to take an assertive stance without being seen as a move to suppress RAB

members. Therefore, following the Thomas (1992) model, the Army was very cooperative and was between *Accommodating* and *Compromising*. RAB members, on the other hand, were very assertive and uncooperative or neither assertive nor cooperative. The RAB member that filed the lawsuit against the Army was *Competing* and used the courts to make his position clear. Another RAB member used *Avoidance* as her method of conflict behavior because she walked out of a meeting while the Army was presenting its explanation of the outcome of the lawsuit.

Three separate facilitators were used throughout the history of the Fort Ord RAB. Because the RAB could not resolve conflicts, even with the assistance of facilitators, the second facilitation group recommended that the RAB disband in 1997 and the third concurred with the Office of the Secretary of Defense in May 1999 to disband the Fort Ord RAB. Finally, neither group held the other in very high regard. Predominantly negative responses were given to the questions about one sides appreciation of the others point of view or input. This polarity between the Army and citizen members of the RAB created a dysfunctional conflict situation as described by Robbins (1992) in Chapter III.

Because all members of the Fort Ord RAB could not resolve their differences within their own group or with the assistance of outside groups, communication among the members of the RAB could not go beyond petty arguments and the ability of the RAB to work towards a common goal was severely diminished.

5. Primary Research Question

What are the successful and less-successful practices of the Restoration Advisory Board process in transitioning Fort Ord from military to civilian use?

Other than providing some community members the ability to voice their own opinions about environmental issues, the Fort Ord RAB succumbed to many obstacles known to researchers of citizen advisory groups since the 1970s. Membership attrition lessened community representation and lowered the technical knowledge base of the RAB because no training was provided to new members. Since technical knowledge was low, members relied heavily on the Army and regulatory agencies for information. Because of their reliance for information, the RAB was unable to establish any form of autonomy since very little was given under the mandates forming RABs. RAB members' apparent expectations of being a decision-making body prevented them from allowing individual inputs, which led to procedural arguments that consumed the RAB's time and efforts. Despite all of these shortcomings had the RAB been able to constructively deal with its internal conflicts some usefulness could have come from the RAB. As it was, the RAB's inability to overcome conflict ended any chance of this RAB succeeding.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

First, because of inherent conflicts between citizens and bureaucrats, it is recommended that the services of a neutral facilitator be secured before the first meeting is held. The facilitator should work to eliminate any early conflicts before they have a chance to become dysfunctional. Second, to improve support for the environmental cleanup plan, future RABs should be formed earlier in the process. The more involved the RAB is in developing the cleanup plan, the more ownership they have in the process. Because a RAB is not a decision-making body, the earlier they provide inputs, the more

likely those inputs are to be incorporated into the cleanup plan. Thus more clearly defining their advisory role. Third, when an installation is placed on a closure list, a stakeholder analysis should be conducted to determine what groups need to be represented on the RAB and attempt to attract members with some level of technical knowledge. While it is not feasible to require every member to have technical knowledge, if some members have this knowledge, they can act as independent sources of information for those members that do not understand technical issues. Fourth, technical training should be provided throughout the RAB process, especially for new members, to keep technical knowledge high. Fifth, do not expect laypersons to understand *Robert's Rules of Order*. Some members may be intimidated by the requirement to follow set procedures to provide individual comments. Instead, create procedures along the lines of fairness and equality. Make assurances that everyone will have a chance to provide input and comment on issues placed before the group. Finally, the installation should retain more control early in the RAB process to provide direction. If less control is needed later in the process, give greater control to the RAB. By giving up control too early, any attempt to regain control will be seen as an attempt to lessen the RABs influence.

C. SUGGESTED FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH

After the Fort Ord RAB disbanded in May 1999, the Army adopted a different forum to continue providing information to and seeking input from the surrounding communities. The same Army and regulatory agency representatives sat on a panel while a facilitator acted as a buffer between the panel and the audience. Many former citizen

members of the RAB were in the audience expressing the same opinions they did before the RAB was disbanded. Research on the effectiveness of this alternative approach should be conducted. The research would include interviews with former RAB members to determine if they felt community needs were addressed and examine the progress of the Army's environmental cleanup effort using the amount of land transferred since May 1999 as a measure of success.

Other case studies could be conducted at bases where RABs were formed before the base officially closed to determine if greater involvement by a RAB earlier in the process alleviated many of the problems encountered by the Fort Ord RAB. Operating bases that chose to establish RABs could also be studied to see how well a RAB works when the facility must continue to operate while keeping community concerns in mind. Finally, a case study of a successful RAB could be researched to determine key characteristics of effectiveness from the perspective of a positive example.

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APPENDIX A. RESTORATION ADVISORY BOARD INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

1. How important is citizen participation in the environmental cleanup process at Fort Ord?

| | | | | |
|------------------|-----------------------|-----------|-----------------------|-----------|
| | | | | |
| Not Necessary | Somewhat Necessary | Necessary | Somewhat Essential | Essential |

Why is citizen participation important in this process?

2. To what extent do you think the RAB represents all major citizen groups?

| | | | | |
|------------|-----|---------|-----|------------------|
| | | | | |
| Not at All | < ½ | About ½ | > ½ | All major groups |

What actions have increased/decreased representation?

What group do you represent?

3. The role of RAB members is clearly understood?

| | | | | |
|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | | | | |
| Strongly Disagree | Somewhat Disagree | Neither Agree nor Disagree | Somewhat Agree | Strongly Agree |

How has this affected RAB performance? Example.

4. Necessary training was provided to the RAB members?


| | | | | |
|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | | | | |
| Strongly Disagree | Somewhat Disagree | Neither Agree nor Disagree | Somewhat Agree | Strongly Agree |

What type(s) of training was/were provided?

What was the most beneficial training?

Is there any other type of training that would have enabled the RAB to be more effective?


5. On average, to what extent has the RAB been involved in the development of the BRAC Cleanup Plan?



Has the level of involvement been too little, about right, or too much?

How could the level of involvement be increased/decreased?


6. To what extent did the BRAC Cleanup Team implement RAB recommendations?



What types of recommendations were most likely to be implemented?


What types of recommendations were least likely to be implemented?

7. The "advisory" nature of the RAB (i.e., no decision authority) significantly reduces its impact on the cleanup effort at Fort Ord.



What could be done to increase the RAB's impact on cleanup efforts?


8. The RAB controls its own agenda...



Give an example of how this level of control has influenced RAB effectiveness.


What agenda items does the RAB have the most control over?

9. To what extent does the RAB gather its own information, in addition to the information provided by the Army (surveys, attend conferences, consult technical experts, or consult groups)?




What is done with the information once gathered?

10. To what extent does the RAB seek input and support from its constituents for its recommendations?




11. How clear are RAB goals?



What is an example of a clear goal?


What is an example of a vague goal?

12. How often has the RAB assessed its progress?




What are the RAB's criteria for assessing progress?


13. To what extent do RAB members agree about the goals of the RAB?



14. To what extent do RAB members agree about the priority of the goals of the RAB?




15. To what extent do RAB members agree about the means to achieve the goals of the RAB?



What is an example of how agreement increased RAB effectiveness?

What is an example of how disagreement impeded RAB effectiveness?

16. Formal meeting and participation procedures are followed by the RAB.




How has this impacted RAB effectiveness?

What is an example of how this positively impacted the RAB?


What is an example of how this negatively impacted the RAB?

17. The RAB's appreciation of the Army's point of view is...



What could be done to increase the RAB's appreciation of the Army?

18. The Army's appreciation of the RAB's input is...



What could be done to increase the Army's appreciation of the RAB?

19. How would you describe the role of the RAB?

Empty Ritual Symbolic Necessary Substantive Essential

What 1 or 2 actions could the RAB do to shift towards a more substantive role?

20. Overall, what primary factors facilitated RAB success?

21. Overall, what primary factors impeded RAB success?

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APPENDIX B. SAFETY BROCHURE

DANGER

Areas where unexploded ordnance may be present are posted with DANGER signs. Do not enter areas where you see signs like the ones below. Off-road vehicular traffic is prohibited on the former Fort Ord.

PELIGRO

Las zonas donde podría estar presente material de artillería que aún no ha explotado están marcadas con letreros de PELIGRO. No entre en zonas donde vea letreros como los que se muestran abajo. El tráfico automotor fuera de la vía principal está prohibido en el antiguo Fort Ord.



If you have questions regarding the ordnance and explosives cleanup at the former Fort Ord, please contact:

Si tiene preguntas relacionadas con los armamentos y la erradicación de explosivos en el antiguo Fort Ord, por favor póngase en contacto con:

Directorate of Environmental and Natural Resources
Management at the Presidio of Monterey (831) 242-7924

SAFETY ALERT

Ordnance and Explosives at former Fort Ord

If you discover any object that resembles those shown inside this brochure

DO NOT TOUCH IT!

Instead, **MARK THE LOCATION**, and
CALL THE FEDERAL POLICE

at (831) 242-7851 or 242-7852 to report what you've found.

ALERTA DE SEGURIDAD

Material de artillería y explosivos en el antiguo Fort Ord

Si descubre cualquier objeto que se asemeje a los que se muestran en este folleto

¡NO LO TOQUE!

En su lugar, **MARQUE LA UBICACIÓN**, y
LLAME A LA POLICÍA FEDERAL


al (831) 242-7851 ó 242-7852 para reportar lo que encontró.



HISTORY

As an active U.S. Army post, Fort Ord's mission was to train soldiers to protect the interests of the United States. An important part of the mission was infantry and artillery training. As a result of this training, unexploded ordnance remains on portions of the now-closed Fort Ord.

After reviewing the records of past training activities, the Army identified areas where ordnance may still remain and began conducting investigations and removing ordnance from those areas. Cleanup of all identified areas will not be completed for many years.



Si usted encuentra cualquier objeto que sea potencialmente peligroso, no lo toque. Marque la ubicación y llame a la policía federal.

Don't Touch It!
Mark the Location
Call the Federal Police
 at 1-800-243-7861 or 243-7862.

Si descubre cualquier objeto que sea potencialmente peligroso, no lo toque. Marque la ubicación y llame a la policía federal.

NO LO TOQUE!
MARQUE LA UBICACIÓN
LLAME A LA POLICÍA FEDERAL
 al 1-800-243-7861 o 243-7862.

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